RSSRehabilitating Theonomy (I)W.H. ChellisIt is ha…
Rehabilitating Theonomy (I)
W.H. Chellis
It is hard not to feel an attraction to theonomic ethics. Theonomy is simple (the Bible is made the sufficient standard for law and politics) and objective (Israel’s theocratic civil law is applied to all nations at all times). Further, for Reformed Christians who feel an attraction to libertarianism, theonomy establishes a clear limitation on state power while avoiding the excesses of moral relativism associated with other forms of libertarianism.
For Christians attracted to theonomy’s congenial qualities it is hard to overcome the notion that ethics is a simple choice between “theonomy and autonomy”. How can any Reformed believer disagree? Yet, the Westminster Confession of Faith declares, “To them also, as a body politic, He gave sundry judicial laws, which expired together with the State of that people; not obliging any other now, further than the general equity thereof may require (WCF 19:4).” Attempts have been made to reconcile the WCF with a theonomic defense of the “abiding validity of the law of God in exhaustive detail”, yet the natural reading of the confessional language seems to emphasize discontinuity. Even R.J. Rushdoony was forced to declare, “at this point, the Confession is guilty of nonsense (Insitutes of Biblical Law, pg. 551).”
Should we conclude that the Reformed Divines were legal positivists and moral relativists? Did the Divines choose autonomy over theonomy? Or, is it possible, that the Reformed tradition offers us a long neglected but confessional alternative? Could the moral law of God serve as a basis for public ethics without degenerating into theonomic radicalism?
The answer, deeply buried beneath the weight of 20th Century anti-scholasticism, is found in the Reformed natural law tradition. Notice what I have not said… I have not said that the answer is found in the enlightenment natural law tradition. This is an important distinction. The Reformed natural law tradition, as expounded by John Calvin, Jerome Zanchius, Peter Martyr Vermigli, Johannes Althusius, James Ussher, William Perkins, Samuel Rutherford, and Francis Turretin, is rooted in the objective revelation of God’s moral law in nature and in Scripture.
Recognizing the distorted faculties of fallen man, Reformed theologians viewed the Ten Commandments as a summary of the first principles of the natural law. As such they universally bound all men at all times. On the other hand, the civil laws given to Israel might be rooted in the moral law or they might be rooted in Israel’s peculiar calling as a shadow of God’s greater Son and Servant, Jesus Christ.
Therefore, the civil law of Israel is rightly divided between laws of general equity (rooted in the natural law) and laws of particular equity (laws whose eschatological purpose was like that of the ceremonial law). Laws of particular equity have no relevance to nations beyond the Israelite theocracy. On the other hand, laws of general equity are rooted in the moral law of God (the natural law). Such laws are not the natural law itself but an application of the natural law to a peculiar place and time (with its own cultural, economic, political, and historical context). The civil laws of general equity cannot bind other nations with their unique contextual applications. Yet, the civil law can serve as a casebook of natural law precedent while illuminating how God applied His moral precepts to Israel. Applications must be drawn to New Covenant nations only by way of instructive analogy.
Those interested in the Reformed Scholastic approach to natural law should read Jerome Zanchius on natural law and pick up Stephen Grabill’s new book Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics. Rooting our ethics in the Reformed tradition, theonomists and their critics may find common ground after all.
Dave
January 30th, 2007 at 8:22 pm
A great post, thank you for that.
Tonight, I providentially received an interesting message in my fortune cookie after consuming my sesame chicken, it read: “Never does nature say one thing and wisdom another.”
Interesting huh?
Anonymous
January 31st, 2007 at 12:05 pm
does the paradigm of reformed natural law, then, while disallowing that the template for or substance of general equity can be in conflict, allow for various interpretations for its application? that is to say, for example, it is disallowable to say stealing is right; it is always wrong. but while some may render certain actions as stealing others may not; that conclusions as to application may be wrong? to get even more specific: some reformed argue for homosexual marriage/civil union, some against. does this paradigm allow that both are vulnerable to being wrong in their conclusions, or that even the applications of the moral law can be constant or eternal?
zrim
W.H. Chellis
January 31st, 2007 at 3:23 pm
zrim,
Great question. I will through out another post that will hopefully make this more clear.
For now, I would suggest that the general equity refers to universal principles applicable at all times and all places. Where laws contradict the equity of the moral law they are not true laws at all.
Yet, legal codes are not bundles of general principles but of specific applications. This is where the rubber meets the road for Reformed ethics. While general equity is universal its applications must be particular and local. To be effective, the law must not be static but dynamic and tailored to specific historial circumstances. Therefore, there is no one size fits all approach to applications.
Can applications be wrong? Absolutely! They are dependent on the traditions, customs, and reasoning ability of fallen men. This is why Reformed ethics is hard work.
Jared
February 2nd, 2007 at 10:26 am
A couple years ago, David Van Drunen gave a lecture at RPTS’ Westminster Conference on the natural law within the Westminster Standards. It could be added to the reading/listening list in this area. For me personally, it softened the edges of my presuppositionalism…in a good way.
Paul Manata
February 2nd, 2007 at 11:50 pm
I don’t mind the “simplistic” theonomy. In fact, I divide the theonomy debate into two positions: (i) theonomy simpliciter and (ii) austere theonomy. I’ve seen problems with many versions of (ii), but, for me, (i) remains undefeated.
Many times, when someone thinks they’ve refuted ‘theonomy,’ they’ve really refuted (ii), which is, “someone’s version of how theonomy simpliciter might look as it developes into austere theonomy.
In respects to the WCF “problem,” I don’t see how it’s problematic for theonomy simpliciter since theonomy simpliciter agrees that the particular laws, for that body politic have expired. It is interesting to note, though, that the confession uses the term “expire” for the judicial laws and “abrogate” for the cerimonial laws.
best,
PM
W.H. Chellis
February 3rd, 2007 at 1:39 pm
Hi Jared,
Dr. VanDrunen has done a great deal of good work on Natural Law. I think you have hit the nail on the head when you suggest that your original concern about natural law was rooted in your presuppositionalism.
I am a presuppositionalist as well but am not sure that Van Til’s antagonism to natural law necessarily follows. I am really glad for the work of Scott Oliphint at Westminster whose latest book Reasons for Faith is allows Van Til to be in conversation with the Reformed Scholastics.
Colin
February 4th, 2007 at 2:02 am
Check out Forrest W. Schultz’s review of Grabill’s book:
http://vantiltool.blogspot.com/2006/10/natural-law-and-reformed-theology.html